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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Sandy City generally accepts the appellants' second and 
third statement of the issues before this court. However, the 
first issue should be restated to more accurately reflect the 
nature of the inquiry and actual ruling by the trial court which 
concluded the record supports a reasonable basis for the zoning 
change. Sandy City would restate the issue as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in determining 
that the legislative record supports a reasonable basis for 
the zoning change consistent with the City's exercise of its 
police power in furtherance of the protection of the public 
health, safety and welfare. 
Sandy agrees that the appropriate appellate standard of review on 
all these issues is for correctness. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22. Set forth at 
appellants' Addendum B. 
2. U.S. Constitution, Amendment V. Set forth at 
appellants' Addendum B. 
3. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV. Set forth at 
appellants' Addendum B. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1963). Set forth at 
appellants' Addendum B. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case as presently constituted is the result of a 
consolidation of three separate actions. Several claims had been 
resolved by the time the trial court heard cross-motions by the 
parties for summary judgment on the three remaining issues. The 
primary focus was on the claim by Smith Investment Company and 
Sandy Hills, Inc. (jointly "Smith") that Sandy City had 
improperly rezoned a portion of property owned by it from 
commercial to residential uses, amounting to a substantive due 
process violation and an uncompensated taking. Smith's second 
claim was that the City improperly barricaded the end of 
1055 East Street, cutting off access to the rear of its property. 
The last issue was an allegation of trespass arising from water 
flows from adjoining subdivisions which allegedly drained into 
irrigation ditches on Smith's property. Smith has chosen not to 
pursue the trespass issue on appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 3, 
n. 1. 
Pursuant to the cross-motions, the trial court determined 
that the City's rezoning of the property was reasonable and did 
not give rise to a constitutional violation or an uncompensated 
taking. It also ruled that the barricading of 1055 East was a 
reasonable exercise of the City's police power and did not 
deprive Smith of all reasonable access to the property. Smith 
argues on appeal that these rulings are erroneous. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Substantive Due Process and Takings Issues 
1. In 1980 Sandy City adopted a new Development Code which 
included comprehensive general plan amendments for the entire 
City. R. 459. 
2. Following adoption of the new Development Code, the 
City began a systematic process of evaluating and enacting zoning 
changes throughout the City to reflect the newly adopted 
development code. This was done by "quadrant" or designated 
community area. Smith's property is located within the "Sandy 
Community." R. 220-255, 459, 484-509. 
3. Smith's property was not targeted for an isolated 
zoning change, but was merely one of a large number of proposed 
changes for the City. R. 220-255, 459, 484-509. 
4. Prior to a final decision to rezone the rear portion of 
the Smith property from C-2 to R-2-10, the City engaged in a long 
and comprehensive evaluation which included input from a variety 
of sources such as the Sandy Community Citizens' Report, R. 263-
89, 459, a Planning Department Report, R. 220-255, 459, public 
input at various meetings and public hearings before the Planning 
Commission and City Council from September 1980 through April 14, 
1981. R. 297-301, 329-85, 459-60. 
5. The Sandy Community Citizens' Report, R. 263-289, 
includes as one of the primary Sandy Planning Community goals and 
policies to preserve residential uses within the original part of 
Sandy in order to develop a strong community identity and 
preserve the integrity of this area of the City. R. 277. 
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6. The Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals and Policies, 
R. 302-28, identifies goals and policies addressing issues of 
growth, land use, community identity, transportation and others. 
Among those goals and policies is that proposed uses of lot 
depths exceeding 2 00 feet should be subject to conditional site 
plan review. R. 319. There is no requirement that development to 
a depth of 200 feet be defined or treated as "strip commercial." 
7. On September 30, 1980, a staff member of the Planning 
Department made a presentation to the City Council on the 
proposed zoning changes. That report included the following 
recommendation related to the Smith property: 
With the existing commercial it appears there may 
be excessive commercially zoned land and developed 
commercial square footage in this area for this 
type of commercial use development. Additional 
concerns were over the number of stub streets that 
go into the back of the property, existing street 
pattern and traffic generation and the access to 
future commercial development. 
In response to these and other concerns, the Planning Staff 
recommended rezoning the rear portion of Smith's property from 
C-2 to R-2-10. R. 484-509. 
8. The rear portion of the Smith parcel was rezoned to 
R-2-10 on April 14, 1981. R. 461. 
9. At the City Council meeting when the rezoning decision 
was made, "Mr. Smith was told that he could come back again with 
a request for rezoning but should bring a site plan for the 
Council to review." R. 461. 
10. Subsequent to the rezoning, Smith never made a rezoning 
application, a request for general plan amendment or an 
application for development approval. 
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11. The R-2-10 zone permits single family residential use, 
two-family housing, certain agricultural uses and home 
occupations. Conditional uses within that zone include, but are 
not limited to, group day care, dwelling for the elderly and 
handicapped, planned unit developments, outdoor recreation, etc. 
R. 510. 
12. The trial court entered its memorandum decision on 
May 21, 1996. R. 775-81. 
Barricading Issue 
13. Smith's property has approximately 286 feet of frontage 
directly accessing onto 700 East Street. R. 694. 
14. Abutting Smith's north property line at its west end is 
the Southland Acres No. 3 subdivision. R. 694, 706. 
15. Southland Acres No. 3 contains a dedicated roadway 
designated as 1055 East and 1075 East Street. The street curves 
to the southeast, resulting in the change of numerical 
designation at the south end of the street. R. 694, 706. This 
single, continuous street will be referred to herein as 
1055 East. 
16. S m i t h ' s n o r t h p r o p e r t y l i n e i s t he terminus of 
1055 E a s t . R. 694, 706.i7 
17. Abu t t ing Smi th ' s south p r o p e r t y l i n e a r e the Brighton 
View Subd iv i s ion and t h e Del Ruby Subdiv i s ion . R. 694-95, 706. 
- Smith carefully implies that the barricades placed by the c i ty block 
th i s public roadway. The dedicated s t r ee t , however, terminates at the 
boundary between Smith's property and the subdivision. The barricades were 
erected at the end of the dedicated public roadway. 
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18. Through the Brighton View Subdivision runs Brighton 
Drive. Smith's south property line is the terminus of Brighton 
Drive. R. 695, 706. 
19. Through the Del Ruby Subdivision runs Jean Drive. 
Smith's south property line is the terminus of Jean Drive. 
R. 694. 
20. On the west side of Smith's property lies the 
Mt. Jordan Addition Subdivision. R. 695, 706. 
21. Through the Mt. Jordan Addition Subdivision runs 
Greenwood Drive with a stub road turning off Greenwood Drive. 
Smith's west property line is the terminus of Greenwood Drive. 
R. 695, 706. 
22. On May 23, 1978, at a regularly scheduled and noticed 
public meeting, the Sandy City Council discussed, among other 
items, the request of property owners living on 1055 East that 
the City reinstall permanent barricades at the south end of the 
street which had recently been removed. The Council voted to 
erect a temporary barricade pending investigation by City 
departments and an evaluation and recommendation by the police 
department. R. 707-08. 
23. On May 30, 1978, at a regularly scheduled and noticed 
public meeting, the Sandy City Council reviewed reports from City 
departments and a recommendation from the police department that 
1055 East be permanently barricaded. The Council voted 
unanimously to have permanent barricades reinstalled. R. 768-69. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the early 1980s Sandy City undertook a comprehensive 
city-wide evaluation of its zoning ordinances which resulted in 
an update of its general plan and development code and rezoning 
of parcels within the City to be consistent with the updated 
code. These legislative decisions are entitled to the same 
deference and presumption of validity afforded to the original 
exercise of the City's legislative discretion in furtherance of 
its police powers through the enactment of the original zoning 
ordinances. Smith has failed to overcome that strong presumption 
of validity or demonstrate any basis to establish that the 
rezoning constituted a substantive due process violation. The 
trial court correctly determined that the City's exercise of its 
police power in rezoning Smith's property was proper and did not 
deprive Smith of any constitutionally protected right or 
interest. 
Smith has also failed to meet the substantial threshold 
requirement necessary in order to show deprivation of all 
economically viable or reasonable use of its property in order to 
assert a takings claim under federal or state law. Its arguments 
based upon deprivation of a unilateral development expectation or 
diminution in value of its property fail to meet the legal 
requirements to establish a taking. The trial court properly 
ruled that there was no regulatory taking. 
The City's barricading of the end of a dedicated public 
street at the boundary of a subdivision did not give rise to a 
compensable injury. The barricades were installed pursuant to a 
proper exercise of the City's police power. Any limitation of 
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access by these barricades caused no damage to the property 
because there was sufficient and reasonable alternative access. 
The trial court appropriately granted the City summary 
judgment on all the issues before it. Its well-reasoned decision 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SANDY CITY'S COMPREHENSIVE CITY-WIDE GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT 
AND RELATED REZONING, INCLUDING SMITH'S PROPERTY, DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
In analyzing Smith's substantive due process claims 
challenging the validity of the zoning ordinance affecting their 
property, several undisputed underlying facts set forth in the 
legislative record should be considered. First, the rezoning of 
the Smith property was not, as they imply, a "targeted" zoning 
change. Rather, it was part of a city-wide effort to re-evaluate 
and modify the long-term plans for development of the City and to 
make appropriate zoning changes consistent with the revised 
general plan. Second, Smith argues that using the rear portion 
of their property for residential development would be 
"detrimental to the existing community." This, however, is a 
judgment decision reserved to the City Council as representatives 
of the community. The courts typically grant considerable 
deference to municipal bodies making this type of legislative 
determination. Third, Smith made no application for development 
approval prior to the zoning change which would establish any 
type of vested right to maintain the historical zoning of the 
property. Fourth, much of Smith's argument is based upon their 
unilateral expectations that the commercial zoning of their 
property zoning would be fixed in time and not subject to any 
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change based on the evolving needs and welfare of the community. 
There is clearly no legal support for this argument that the City 
is forever bound by a decision made by its legislative body 
thirty years earlier. 
A. SANDY CITY'S LEGISLATIVE LAND USE DECISIONS ARE 
ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OP VALIDITY AND BROAD 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE. SMITH HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT 
PRESUMPTION OR TO DEMONSTRATE WHY DEFERENCE SHOULD NOT 
BE AFFORDED. 
Substantive due process claims are reviewed by courts with 
considerable deference to legislative decisions with the exercise 
of zoning and police powers deemed presumptively valid. E. H. 
Ziegler, 1 Rathkopf's the Law of Zoning and Planning, 4ed (1989) 
§ 3.04 [1] at 3-22. The burden of overcoming this presumption and 
deference lies with the plaintiff who is making the due process 
challenge. Id. Utah law is in accord with this general 
proposition. See E.G., Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 
1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) (ordinance passed within the scope of 
legislatively granted power is accorded a presumption of 
constitutional validity). The Utah Supreme Court has 
traditionally granted municipalities considerable discretion in 
their exercise of the legislative power to zone. 
In the review of zoning cases the function of 
the court is narrow and its scope is limited to a 
determination of whether or not the action of the 
Board of County Commissioners as a legislative 
body is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or 
capricious. No contention is made that the county 
did not act within its grant of powers from the 
legislature in its adoption of the original zoning 
ordinance. The prior decisions of this court 
without exception have laid down the rule that the 
exercise of the zoning power is a legislative 
function to be exercised by the legislative bodies 
of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning 
plan, its necessity, the nature and boundaries of 
the district to be zoned are matters which lie 
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solely within that discretion. It is the policy 
of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions 
that it will avoid substituting its judgment for 
that of the legislative body of the municipality. 
Crestview-Holladav Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 
P.2d 1150, 1151-52 (Utah 1976). 
The burden a plaintiff must bear in overcoming the 
presumption of validity is substantial. 
While the most common statement of the degree of 
proof required to overcome the presumption of 
validity is that the issue must be removed from 
the area of reasonable debate, the courts have 
used a variety of language to describe what all 
agree is an extraordinary burden. A number of 
courts require that the litigant asserting 
invalidity prove by "clear and convincing" 
evidence that the ordinance is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or otherwise invalid. Some courts 
require "clear and affirmative" evidence of 
invalidity, and others simply require that the 
invalidity be "clearly" shown or conclusively 
demonstrated. 
K. H. Young, 1 Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed (1996) 
§ 3.21 at 136-37 (emphasis added). 
Where downzoning results as part of a comprehensive zoning 
amendment, as opposed to piecemeal zoning, the zoning ordinances 
are afforded the same broad deference given to original zoning 
enactments. 
A truly comprehensive rezoning or comprehensive 
zoning ordinance amendment--affecting a 
substantial portion of land within the zoning 
jurisdiction belonging to many landowners, and 
usually undertaken in implementation of broad 
public policy and, typically, after studies and 
recommendations of planning staff or consultants--
is universally considered a legislative act 
entitled to broad judicial deference. Such a 
comprehensive rezoning, for purposes of judicial 
review, occupies the same posture of presumed 
validity as the original enactment of a zoning 
ordinance. 
Ziegler § 26A.02[3][a] at 26A-11, 12. 
10 
Smith has failed to overcome the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of validity and challenging the deference applicable 
to such a zoning decision. It argues impliedly, without 
supporting authority, that the City is not entitled to the same 
judicial deference historically afforded such legislative 
decisions. The crux of Smith's argument is that it disagrees 
with the City's evaluation and determination of what is in the 
best interest of its citizenry. It also disagrees with the trial 
court's determination that the zoning decision is supported by 
the record and would have this Court substitute its judgment for 
that of the Sandy City Council. Not only does this fail to 
address the deference and presumption issues, it is contrary to 
both the undisputed factual record and clear statement of the 
controlling law. 
B. THE CITY'S REZONING OP SMITH'S PROPERTY CONSISTENT WITH 
A CITY-WIDE UPDATE OF ITS GENERAL PLAN AND DEVELOPMENT 
CODE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATION. 
In evaluating a claimed substantive due process violation 
arising from a zoning ordinance, it is important to bear in mind 
certain fundamental legal principles. First, an owner of real 
property "holds it subject to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant 
to a state's police power." Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City 
of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1980) citing Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). See 
also Marshall v. Bd. of County Comm's, 912 F.Supp 1456, 1464 (D. 
Wyo 1996) (a property owner has no vested property right in a 
contemplated development or entitlement to a particular zoning 
change). Second, Smith failed to acquire a vested right to 
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develop under the former C-2 zoning. See Western Land at 3 96 
(development right vests when owner makes application under 
applicable zoning ordinance and proceeds with reasonable 
diligence). 
Smith argues for a very narrow construction of the City's 
police powers and exercise of zoning authority granted by the 
legislature.^ This is contrary to Utah law. In 1980, the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected and abandoned the narrow, strict 
construction of municipal powers historically known as Dillon's 
Rule. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1135 n.3 (Utah 1980), 
In reaching its holding that exercise of the police power to 
assure the general welfare is entitled to broad deference, the 
Court quoted from McQuillin, Municipal Corporations; 
A general welfare or similar clause, granting 
extremely broad power to a municipal corporation, 
is liberally construed to accord to a municipality 
wide discretion in the exercise of the police 
power. The cases, indeed, reveal an increasing 
judicial inclination under such a clause to accord 
to municipal authorities wider discretion in the 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory exercise, in good 
faith, of the police power in the public interest. 
While under the clause, or under the guise of it, 
personal and property rights recognized by general 
law and guaranteed by organic provisions cannot 
unreasonably be restrained, courts uniformly 
regard the clause as ample authority for a 
reasonable exercise, in good faith, of broad and 
varied municipal activity to protect the health, 
morals, peace and good order of the community, to 
promote its welfare in trade, commerce, industry, 
and manufacture, and to carry out every 
appropriate object contemplated in the creation of 
the municipal corporation. 
-
7
 It is significant to note that Smith's substantive due process 
arguments are largely conclusory with citation to only one case which is not 
dispositive on the due process issue. 
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Hutchinson at 1125, quoting from 6 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, §§ 23, 43-44 (3d rev'd ed. 1969). The Hutchinson 
court concluded that it was inappropriate for the courts to 
impose narrow, strict construction on the exercise of a 
municipality's police powers. 
[I]t is not appropriate for this Court to 
enfeeble local governments on the unjustified 
assumption that strict construction of delegated 
powers is necessary to prevent abuse. The 
enactment of a broad general welfare clause 
conferring police powers directly on the counties 
was to enable them to act in every reasonable, 
necessary, and appropriate way to further the 
public welfare of their citizens. 
Hutchinson at 1121. 
Even before Hutchinson, the Utah courts have interpreted the 
municipal police powers broadly in land use decisions. Navlor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 398 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1965) ("[W]e are more 
than cognizant of the proposition that the governing body of a 
city is endowed with considerable latitude in determining the 
proper uses of property within its confines.") 
Smith identifies a reasonable relationship standard as 
appropriate for evaluation of substantive due process claims 
under federal law. Actually, the standard is much more lenient. 
In addition, it erroneously argues that the burden is on Sandy 
City to demonstrate reasonableness and urges the court to apply a 
narrow interpretation of what constitutes "general welfare." 
The due process inquiry is conducted under a "minimum 
rationality" test which is much less stringent than the 
"reasonable relationship" standard urged by Smith. 
Under this test, the objective of a given piece of 
legislation is usually conceded to be valid, and 
the focus of the inquiry is instead on whether the 
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means adopted are reasonably calculated to achieve 
that objective — a criterion which is satisfied bv 
any conceivable, rational basis in fact or logic 
linking regulation with its intended objective or 
purpose. If this is within the realm of fair 
debate, the regulation is deemed valid. As 
applied by federal courts, and often by state 
courts, this minimum rationality test for due 
process validity grants great deference to 
legislative judgment and involves only minimal 
scrutiny of whether the ends of regulation are 
related to its means. There is no inquiry as to 
whether regulation is unduly restrictive or 
excessive or whether the regulation is 
"reasonable" weighing the private burden and 
public benefits involved. Courts do not inquire 
as to the wisdom, efficacy, or desirability of 
regulation. 
Ziegler § 3.04 [4] at 3-26,27 (extensive footnotes omitted, 
emphasis added). 
It is well-established that the use of zoning ordinances is 
proper to provide a wide range of intangible social values for 
residents of a community. Ziegler § 17A.02 at 17A-4,5. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized the broad scope of objectives which 
can fall within the police power welfare clause. 
The police power is not confined to elimination of 
filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample 
to lay out zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and 
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 
1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), cited with approval in Citv of 
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 1776, 
1781, 131 L.Ed.2d 810 (1995). See also Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 
(1926) (legitimate general welfare purposes include "a more 
favorable environment in which to rear children," "open spaces 
and attractive surroundings," and preserving "the residential 
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character of the neighborhood."); Navlor at 765 (enhancement of 
aesthetic values promotes general welfare). 
The federal courts apply a two-step test to substantive due 
process claims in the zoning context. The first step is to 
"identify[] a legitimate government purpose--a goal--which the 
enacting government body could have been pursuing." Restigouche, 
Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(emphasis in original). The second step "asks whether a rational 
basis exists for the enacting government body to believe that the 
legislation would further the hypothesized purpose." Id. The 
scope of inquiry is much more lenient than argued by Smith. "The 
proper inquiry is concerned with the existence of a conceivable 
rational basis, not whether that basis was actually considered by 
the legislative body." Id. (emphasis added). 
The standard of review under Utah law is limited to a 
determination of whether the city's legislative action is 
"illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious." Crestview-
Holladav at 1152. This is done while affording considerable 
discretion to the legislative act. Id. 
This Court has also discussed the broad nature of the 
exercise of police powers under the general welfare clause in the 
zoning area. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 
P. 2d 602 (Utah App. 1995) .- In Patterson, this Court concluded 
that "the proper exercise of the zoning power does in fact 
promote the public health, safety and welfare." Patterson at 
-
;
 Although Patterson is a case involving a decision of a county Board 
of Adjustment, the discussion of the "welfare" clause is even more applicable 
to the legislative actions of a municipality than to the administrative, 
quasi-judicial acts of the Board of Adjustment. 
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607. Ttie Court went on to s t a t e that exercise of zoning 
au thor i ty would promote public heal th , safety and welfare if the 
exercise of tha t au thor i ty "will make good zoning pol icy, meaning 
i t wi l l cont r ibute to the orderly development of the county as a 
whole." Id. 
As a general matter, i t i s the "widely held view of courts 
tha t zoning [bodies] may undoubtedly look to the future in 
implementing a comprehensive land use plan that promotes and 
enhances the qua l i ty of l i f e within the community." Ziegler 
§ 3.03 at 3-21. 
Whether the rezoning in t e r fe res with Smith's a b i l i t y to 
develop the property to t h e i r perceived highest or most 
p ro f i t ab l e economic advantage or diminishes i t s market value i s 
i r r e l evan t to the due process ana lys i s . Ziegler § 3.04 [3] a t 3-
24; Young §3.25 at 150-51 ("A zoning ordinance i s not 
uncons t i tu t iona l , as applied to p a r t i c u l a r land, merely because 
i t p roh ib i t s a use which i s demonstrably the 'h ighest and b e s t ' 
use of the land in question.")-7 Nor i s i t s ign i f ican t tha t 
Smith has held the property for a long time while expecting to 
develop i t for commercial use. His tor ica l zoning of a property 
doesn ' t f ix i t s use forever. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 124 
A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. 1956) ("The welfare of the community for a l l 
- See V i l l age of Euclid 47 S.Ct. 114 (75% diminution in value as a 
r e s u l t of zoning) , Baranik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(otherwise v a l i d zoning regulat ion i s not unreasonable simply because i t 
causes diminution in value or prevents most prof i table use ) / William C. Haas & 
Co v. City & County, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied 445 U.S. 928 
(1980) (95% diminution in va lue ) . See also Aspen H i l l Venture v. Montgomery 
County Council, 289 A.2d 303 (Md. 1972); Wright v. L i t t l e t o n , 483 P.2d 953 
(Colo. 1971)/ 
16 
time cannot be subordinated to the profit motive of an individual 
landowner.") 
The trial court correctly concluded that the due process 
requirements were met by the City. 
The record supports a reasonable basis for 
effecting the zoning change in 1981. The test of 
a rational relationship to public health, welfare 
and safety is supported in the record. 
R. 777. This ruling clearly meets the minimum rationality test. 
The minimum rationality test is satisfied in Sandy City's 
enactment of its zoning changes. It is easy to conceive that the 
City Council could have believed that by rezoning properties 
throughout the City, including Smith's property, it was 
preserving the residential nature of its community, providing for 
quiet seclusion and making a sanctuary for its citizens. Such 
conjecture, however, is unnecessary. The City actually evaluated 
suggestions from several sources and held multiple public 
hearings and meetings to evaluate its zoning changes. Those 
changes were part of a comprehensive plan and provided, in the 
present case, for expansion of residential properties and 
limitation of commercial uses which would affect the residential 
environment. 
There is no claim or evidence that the City's rezoning of 
Smith's property was outside the scope of its statutory zoning 
authority or that the ordinance was improperly enacted. The 
legislative act is, therefore, entitled to a presumption of 
facial validity. The police power having therefore been properly 
exercised and given that the zoning changes promote orderly 
development of the City, the conclusion must be that the zoning 
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ordinance promotes the public heal th , safety and welfare. 
Pat terson a t 607. 
Whether the City could have reached a d i f ferent conclusion 
based on the fac ts or whether the decision reached was the wisest 
of the ava i lab le choices i s outside the scope of j u d i c i a l 
inquiry . I t i s insuf f ic ien t for Smith to argue tha t the facts 
don ' t support the C i t y ' s conclusion or that a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e 
so lu t ion was ava i l ab le . Their burden i s to demonstrate tha t 
there was no r a t i ona l bas is for the conclusion tha t the City 
reached or tha t i t was otherwise a rb i t r a ry , capricious or 
i l l e g a l . Smith has fa i led to meet t h i s burden. There i s , 
the re fore , no substant ive due process v io la t ion a r i s ing from the 
C i t y ' s rezoning of the Smith property. 
I I . THE CITY'S REZONING OP THE SMITH PROPERTY DOES NOT AMOUNT TO 
AN UNCOMPENSATED TAKING UNDER FEDERAL OR STATE LAW. 
Prior to analyzing Smith's takings arguments, some 
background observations are appropr ia te . F i r s t , Smith has never 
made appl ica t ion to Sandy City for development approval for the 
property a t issue.-7 As a r e s u l t , no f inal decision applying the 
ordinance to the Smith property has been obtained, making i t s 
federal takings claim unripe for decision under federal law. 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v . Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 192 (1985); Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. 
Buchanan,874 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir 1989) A1 Second, there has 
- In f a c t , Smith has done nothing for a substant ia l period of time to 
make improvements beyond the commercial development completed on the front of 
the property many years before. I t has made no recent investment to support 
i t s "investment-backed expectations" argument. 
-' This r ipeness argument was raised before the t r i a l court but did not 
play an express ro le in the court ' s dec i s ion . 
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been no physical taking of Smith's property nor any exercise by 
the City of its power of eminent domain. Third, there has been 
no typical "inverse condemnation" where there is governmental 
intrusion tantamount to or the functional equivalent of a literal 
physical taking or occupation of Smith's property. This is 
simply an issue of whether the rezoning amounts to a regulatory 
taking for which Smith should be compensated. 
Smith bases its takings claim upon (1) the zoning of the 
property at the time they acquired it, (2) their unilateral 
expectation to commercially develop the property, at some 
undefined future time, (3) their assertion that the rezoning 
deprives them of the highest and best use of the property, and 
(4) their claims that the property has diminished in value as a 
result of the rezoning. However, mere diminution in value or 
interference with a unilateral expectation of proceeding with 
commercial development is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish a takings claim entitling the plaintiff to 
compensation. Likewise, the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance 
is not an unconstitutional taking. Knight v. Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Indian Tribes of Wind River Reservation, Wvo., 670 F.2d 
900, 904 (10th Cir. 1982). 
When the U.S. Supreme Court in First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 
2378 (1987) recognized a claim for a compensable regulatory 
taking, it noted that its holding would not apply "in the case of 
... changes in zoning ordinances, variances and the like ..." 
First English at 482 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 321. In addition to 
this threshold issue of the applicability of regulatory takings 
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principles to zoning ordinance actions, a plaintiff must 
establish that it has been denied all economically viable use of 
the property. 
As a general rule, regulation will be held 
confiscatory only where it deprives an owner of 
every use to which the property is reasonably 
adapted or, put another way, regulation is likely 
to be held confiscatory when it denies an owner 
all reasonably beneficial and economically viable 
use of the property, 
Ziegler § 6.08 [1] at 6-26, 27. See also First English at 107 
S.Ct. 2388-89; Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. 
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987). 
Interestingly, Smith cites Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) for the proposition that it need 
not be deprived of all economically feasible use of the property. 
This is facially inconsistent with the statements of Justice 
Scalia in Lucas which emphasize the high threshold showing a 
property owner must overcome to establish a regulatory takings 
claim based upon exercise of police powers. The following 
excerpts from Lucas are illustrative: 
"rendered Lucas's parcels 'valueless."1 p. 2889. 
"complete extinguishment of his property's value ..." 
p. 2890. 
"permanent ban on construction insofar as Lucas's lots 
were concerned" p. 2890. 
"Any reasonable economic use of the lots ... render[ed] 
them valueless." p. 2890 
"obliteration of the value of petitioner's lots" p. 
2890. 
"unconditional and permanent" p. 2891. 
"total deprivation of beneficial use" p. 2894. 
"Without economic value" p. 2894. 
"without economically beneficial or productive options" 
p. 2894. 
"rendered valueless" p. 2896. 
"total regulatory takings" p. 2899. 
"eliminating the land's only economically productive 
use" p. 2900. 
"total taking" p. 2901. 
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All citations to 112 S.Ct. (1992). Clearly Justice Scalia did 
not contemplate mere diminution in value as being sufficient to 
support a regulatory takings claim. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently 
recognized this fundamental requirement to show deprivation of 
all reasonable economic uses. Claion Production Corp. v. Petera, 
70 F.3d 1566, 1577(10th Cir. 1995) ("If a regulation prohibits 
all 'economically beneficial use, then that regulation 
categorically effects a taking."); C. F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 
F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1974) (landowner must show he has been 
deprived of all reasonable uses of his land). Some courts have 
even required that the interference with use of the land be "so 
substantial as to render the property worthless or useless." 
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F.Supp. 455, 460 (D. 
Maryland 1978) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has required the same showing to 
demonstrate a federal takings claim. 
[F]or there to be a taking under a zoning 
ordinance, the landowner must show that he has 
been deprived of all reasonable uses of his land. 
See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 
(10th Cir.1974). For example, almost all zoning 
decisions have some economic impact on property 
values. However, mere diminution in property 
value is insufficient to meet the burden of 
demonstrating a taking by regulation. See Perm 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 
S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Hadacheck v. Los 
Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 
(1915). 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991). 
State law protection from takings is established by 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah. To recover 
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under Utah law, a plaintiff must have a protected interest in 
property which has been taken or damaged for a public use. 
Farmers New World Life Ins. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 
1243-44 (Utah 1990); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. . 795 P.2d 622, 
625 (Utah 1990). 
To state a claim for regulatory taking under Utah law, Smith 
must show facts which indicate that they have been deprived of 
all economically viable use of the land. 
The state has broad authority to regulate or 
prevent certain uses of land under its police 
power; it need compensate a landowner only if 
the regulation deprives him or her of all 
economically viable use of the land, i.e., 
when it effects a "regulatory taking." 
Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 
P. 2d 909, 925 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added) . See also, Cornish 
Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991) (to recover for even 
a "temporary" regulatory taking a plaintiff must be denied all 
uses of the property). 
To state a claim for inverse condemnation, plaintiffs must 
establish that the damages were the direct consequence of a 
public use and to recover damages they must be able to show that 
the damages were (1) anticipated prior to the alleged taking 
event and (2) an unavoidable consequence of the event. Farmers 
New World at 1245. 
Smith has claimed that it was deprived of all economically 
viable or reasonable use of the property. For support, however, 
it argues essentially that (1) it has been deprived of its 
highest and best use of the property, (2) residential 
construction "makes no economic sense," and (3) residential use 
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of the property "would obviously be detrimental to the ex is t ing 
community." None of these arguments meets the threshold showing 
required to a s se r t a takings claim.-7 
The case law r e l i ed on by Smith i s not helpful under the 
fac ts of t h i s case. For example, they deal with adminis t ra t ive 
denial of f i l l permits , Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 
1171 (Fed. Cir . 1994); Bowles v. U.S. 31 Fed.CI. 37 (1994); 
denial of a permit to bui ld on wetlands, K & K Construction. 
I n c . , J.F.K. v. Department of Natural Resources, 551 N.W.2d 413 
(Mich App. 1996) appeal granted 562 N.W.2d 788; and revocation of 
a bui lding permit and subsequent zoning change a f te r construct ion 
had begun, Kempf v. City of Iowa Citv, 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 
1987) . 
By con t ras t , the present case deals with a l e g i s l a t i v e 
ac t ion af fec t ing vacant, undeveloped land for which no 
appl ica t ion for development approval or building permit has been 
made. Smith has c i t ed no author i ty supporting i t s claims in the 
context of a l e g i s l a t i v e amendment to a zoning ordinance which 
a f fec t s undeveloped land. The reason i s obvious--there i s none. 
In addi t ion , Smith would have t h i s court turn i t s back on 
wel l -es tab l i shed federal and Utah law which requires i t to 
demonstrate tha t i t has been deprived of a l l economically v iable 
use of the proper ty . There i s c lea r ly no bas is for doing so. 
-
;
 Smith argued before the t r i a l court that the rear portion of the 
property could not be developed, resu l t ing in a l o s s of economically v iable 
use, because i t would not permit access to that parcel from 700 East across 
i t s commercial development. This argument i s unpersuasive for at l e a s t two 
reasons. F i r s t , as discussed below, there are three poss ib le a l t ernat ive 
access po ints to the property. Second, "A landowner cannot create h i s own 
hardship and then require that zoning regulations be changed to meet that 
hardship." C F. Lvtle at 838. 
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Smith has made none of the required factual allegations to 
establish a basis for inverse condemnation or a regulatory taking 
under Utah law. Nor have they met the threshold requirement to 
establish a taking under federal law. The law requires that 
where a properly enacted zoning ordinance affects a property, 
there is no taking absent a clear showing that there is no longer 
any reasonable economic use for the property. The trial court 
was, therefore, correct in its ruling. 
This Court rejects the plaintiffs' legal theory 
that a diminution in value based upon the 
plaintiff not being able to use the property for 
the plaintiffs' perceived highest and best use is 
a basis upon which to conclude that there has been 
a "taking." 
R. 777. The trial court's ruling should, therefore, be affirmed. 
III. THE CITY'S BARRICADING OP 1055 EAST STREET WAS A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE POWER AND CAUSED SMITH NO COMPENSABLE 
INJURY. 
Smith's argument about the barricading issue suffers from 
several inconsistencies. First, it argues that the dirt roadway-
extending from 1055 East onto its property is a public roadway by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. Then it 
ignores the fact that dirt roads from the other three access 
points in surrounding subdivisions likewise create public 
roadways and argues that it has no reasonable alternative access 
to the rear portion of its property. 
The second argument is that the barricading is an improper 
exercise of the City's police power, an argument made without 
supportive authority. These arguments are not persuasive. 
Essentially, Smith would have this Court grant the City no 
deference on the issue, reject its determinations about the 
24 
h e a l t h , w e l f a r e and s a f e t y of i t s c i t i z e n s , and s u b s t i t u t e 
S m i t h ' s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e C i t y ' s l e g i s l a t i v e body . 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 2 7 - 1 2 - 8 9 I S NOT SELF-EXECUTING AND 
SMITH HAS NOT ASKED FOR A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION THAT 
IT BE APPLIED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC 
ROADWAY OR PRESENTED THE FACTS NECESSARY FOR SUCH A 
DETERMINATION. 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of § 2 7 - 1 2 - 8 9 i n t h i s c a s e i s somewhat 
a t y p i c a l . The normal c a s e i s one where p l a i n t i f f s a r e a t t e m p t i n g 
t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of a roadway a s p u b l i c and t h e 
a f f e c t e d p r o p e r t y owner a t t e m p t s t o a v o i d t h i s r e s u l t . H e r e , f o r 
r e a s o n s t h a t a r e n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r , Smith a t t e m p t s t o e s t a b l i s h 
t h e d i r t r o a d e x t e n d i n g p a s t t h e end of 1055 E a s t a s a p u b l i c 
r o a d . * 
I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e p r o v i s i o n s of § 2 7 - 1 2 - 8 9 a r e n o t s e l f -
e x e c u t i n g . The f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n l e a d i n g t o t h e l e g a l 
c o n c l u s i o n must be made by a c o u r t . 
The law d o e s n o t l i g h t l y a l l o w t h e t r a n s f e r of 
p r o p e r t y from p r i v a t e t o p u b l i c u s e . The p u b l i c ' s 
t a k i n g of p r o p e r t y i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h i s 
c a s e p r e s e n t s r e q u i r e s p r o o f of d e d i c a t i o n by 
c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . Thomson v . Condas, 
27 Utah 2d 129, 130, 493 P .2d 639, 639 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; 
P e t e r s e n v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 3 7 7 - 7 8 , 438 
P . 2 d 545 , 548 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
D r a p e r C i t y v . E s t a t e of B e r n a r d o , 888 P .2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1 9 9 5 ) . T h e r e i s no such c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e i n t h e 
r e c o r d . Whi le t h e C i t y acknowledged t h a t 1055 E a s t had been i n 
p u b l i c u s e from t h e t i m e of i t s d e d i c a t i o n f o r more t h a n t e n 
- The City assumes that Smith doesn't f u l l y understand the 
impl icat ions of i t s argument that § 27-12-89 e s tab l i shes these roads 
c r i s s c r o s s i n g i t s property as public rights-of-way. Such a determination 
would require that any future development of the property would have to 
accommodate these e x i s t i n g roadways. In other words, i f these are public 
roadways, Smith cannot bui ld over them unless and u n t i l they have been 
abandoned pursuant to s t a t e s t a t u t e s . 
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years, it did not, as argued by Smith, admit that the road beyond 
the subdivision had been in use by the public for over ten years. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8. Does Sandy City admit that 
such street in and upon Plaintiff's property 
connecting with 1055 East Street has been in 
existence (first as a dirt road and then hard 
surfaced) since the construction of the U.S. Post 
Office on 700 East Street to the east thereof in 
approximately 1962? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not admit the facts as 
stated in this interrogatory proposed by the 
Plaintiff. ... 
R. 766 (emphasis added). 
Perhaps more fundamental is the fact that Smith never sought 
a declaration that the roadways in question were public roadways 
nor did the trial court evaluate that issue or render an opinion 
which would give effect to § 27-12-89. In its Memorandum 
Decision, the trial court concluded: 
The final claim of the plaintiff is that Sandy 
City has wrongfully barricaded a street designated 
as 1055-1075 East. The record shows that the 
street is part of an adjacent subdivision that 
abuts the plaintiff's undeveloped property. The 
pavement ends at the plaintiffs' property line, 
and Sandy City has apparently placed a barricade 
prohibiting vehicular traffic from leaving the end 
of the paved street to come upon plaintiffs' 
undeveloped property. While at some time it may 
be appropriate to have the barricade removed 
should the street be extended into what is now the 
plaintiffs' property, the City's action in 
barricading the end of the paved street at the 
property line between the developed subdivision of 
the plaintiffs' property is appropriate. The 
plaintiff has other access to its undeveloped 
property, and there presently exists no legitimate 
claim against Sandy City for blocking vehicular 
traffic at the end of the paved section of the 
roadway. 
Memorandum Decision, R. 778-79. 
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B. THE CITY'S PLACEMENT OF BARRICADES AT THE END OP 1055 
EAST WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE POWERS, 
As discussed above, a City's exercise of its police powers 
is afforded broad discretion. E.g., Hutchinson. The courts 
simply do not interfere with this discretion or question the 
wisdom of the legislative body unless the decision is clearly 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Id. at 1126. The court does 
not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body as 
to the wisdom or desirability of the legislative decision. 
The end of 1055 East had been originally barricaded at the 
request of adjoining landowners in approximately 1975. R. 708. 
It had been removed by a contractor who paved a portion of the 
Smith property. R. 708. On May 23, 1978, residents living on 
1055 East requested that the City Council replace the recently 
removed barricades to protect them from excessive dust and 
reckless driving of individuals using 1055 East as access to 
Smith's undeveloped property. At the May 23 meeting, the Council 
voted to temporarily barricade the road pending further 
investigation by the City officials, including police officials. 
R. 708. 
On May 30, 1978, the City Council heard the recommendations 
of the City Engineer and police department. R. 709-10. An 
official from the City Engineer's office reported that 1055 East 
was not necessary access to Smith's property since there were 
four other access roads. R. 710. The police department reported 
that they were unable to enforce traffic laws on Smith's private 
property and recommended a permanent barricade. R. 710. The 
Council voted unanimously to permanently barricade the end of 
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1055 East and to seek reimbursement from the contractor for 
removing the earlier barricades. R. 710. 
The record clearly demonstrates that the City's barricade of 
1055 East was done at the request of and for the benefit of 
citizens living along the street. It was a proper exercise of 
the City's police power to protect the health, safety and welfare 
of its citizens. There is no evidence that the barricading was 
arbitrary or capricious. The City acted upon request and after 
reasonable investigation of the facts. 
C. SMITH WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF REASONABLE ACCESS TO ITS 
PROPERTY. 
Smith's argument on this issue ignores both the undisputed 
facts and the governing legal principles while unilaterally 
concluding that there remains no reasonable access to the 
property and that it is entitled to some amorphous compensation. 
The argument that the barricading somehow deprives Smith of a 
constitutionally protected property interest fails for three 
reasons: (1) Under Utah law, Smith has no claim to compensation 
where it still has reasonable access to the property; (2) There 
was no physical taking of or substantial interference with 
Smith's property; and (3) There were two public meetings on the 
barricade issue which satisfied due process, requirements. 
Where a City's action has allegedly impaired access to an 
individual's property, the focus of the court's inquiry is on 
whether the individual still has reasonable access to the 
property. 
(1) Where governmental action, not amounting to a 
physical taking, effectively deprives a property 
owner of reasonable access to property, the owner 
is entitled to compensation. (2) Where 
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governmental action, not amounting to a physical 
taking, merely interferes with an owner's access 
to property, the owner is not entitled to 
compensation so long as the owner still has 
reasonable access. (3) Where governmental action, 
not amounting to a physical taking, substantially 
impairs a right appurtenant to an owner's 
property, or otherwise causes peculiar injury, and 
thereby results in substantial devaluation, the 
owner is entitled to compensation. 
Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325-26 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Although the barricade may interfere with access to 
plaintiff's property from 1055 East, there remain four (4) 
reasonable, alternative accesses to the property: 286 feet 
frontage along 700 East, two access streets from the south, and 
one access street from the southwest. 
The trial court correctly determined that the three 
remaining access roads from surrounding subdivisions and access 
from 700 East on the front of Smith's property constituted 
reasonable access. Without indicating what would be reasonable 
access, Smith claims the trial court's decision was erroneous and 
that Smith "dispute [s] that the alternative accesses constitute 
'reasonable access.'" This is simply argument for argument's 
sake which ignores the fundamental undisputed facts before the 
court. 
The trial court properly concluded that there continued to 
be reasonable access to Smith's property. The City's decision to 
barricade 1055 East was reasonable and within its discretion in 
the exercise of its police powers. As a result, Smith suffered 




Smith has failed, both before the trial court and on appeal, 
to overcome the strong legislative presumption of validity and 
broad deference afforded to the City and establish that its 
exercise of its zoning powers was in any way improper, 
constituted a deprivation of any constitutionally protected 
rights or amounted to a taking of property without compensation. 
Nor has it shown that the City's exercise of its police power in 
barricading the end of a dedicated public street exceeded its 
authority or was improper, arbitrary or capricious. 
The trial court's rulings on these issues are adequately 
supported by the record and are, as a matter of law, correct. 
This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's ruling. 
DATED this [\S day of September, 1997. 
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT 
By /£ fb*<L$f— 
i rnet t 
Att/o^neys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
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